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TAX COMMENT
Amendment. It is the death of the grantor which brings about "that
shifting of the economic benefits of the property which is the real
subject of the tax.6 It is patent that in the instant case the death
of the husband brought into being new property rights in the wife 7
which constitute "that shifting of the ecenomic benefits" upon which
the tax is laid." Since these rights are created at a period subsequent to the enactment of the act it cannot be said that the operation
of the statute is retroactive. 9
The statute is expressly made applicable to estates created and
existing before the passage of the act, 10 the same provision with
little variation appearing in the 1916 and successive acts ', This
type of property interest has therefore been embraced within an
established taxing system prior to the creation of the estates in
question, and the fact that it was so embraced relieves the statute of
the objection that it is arbitrarily retroactive. To hold otherwise
would make the statute amenable to evasion, and would be entirely
opposed to the express intention of Congress.
H. P.

ESTATE TAX-TRANSFER TAx-DECEDENT Non Compos Mentis.
-In December, 1930, while non compos mentis, one Mr. Bowles
transferred certain of his preferred and common shares of stock in
a Marine Surety Co. to his wife, Louise, absolutely. He died in
July, 1924, never having been judicially declared insane. The government attempted to tax these shares on the theory that at the time
of the death of Mr. Bowles, he had an interest therein which after
his death was subject to payment of (a) the charges against the
estate, (b) the expenses of its administration and (c) the distribution as part of his estate.' Held, The shares were not taxable. Safe
Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Tait, Collector of Interna
Reveniie, 54 F. (2d) 383 (D. C. Md. 1931).

'Chase Natl. Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1928) ; Note
(1930) 5 ST. JoHl's L. Rav. 147.
'Supra note 1, at p. 503, 50 Sup. Ct. at 358.
'Chase Natil. Bank v. U. S., supra note 6.
Coolidge v. Long, supranote 3.

"Section 302, subd. (h) of REv. AcT of 1924 reads: "Subdivisions (b),
(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of this section shall apply to the transfers, trust,
estates, interests, rights, powers, and relinquishment of power, as severally
enumerated and described therein, whether made, created, arising, existing,
exercised, or relinquished before or after the enactment of this act."
'Section 202, REv. AcT of 1916, 39 Stat. 1000, 1002; §300, REv. AcT of
1917, 39 Stat. 1000, 1002; §402, REv. AcT of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097; §402,
REv. Acr of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 278.
'Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 51 Sup. Ct. 49 (1930).
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The subject of inheritance tax was reviewed from a new and
an unusual angle. As the court itself expressed it, "The proposition now advanced by the government is novel. If sound it will
establish an entirely new principle in estate or inheritance taxation,
both Federal and State." 2 If a person is non compos mentis in fact
but not judicially declared so to be, his contracts and conveyances
are voidable at3 his option, but if there is an adjudication of insanity,
they are void.

The government claimed that Bowles' death was the fact or
event which, by removing the possibility or revocation of the gift
or transfer, made the gift absolute, and thus sought to treat the
property as transferred by his death to the beneficiary.4 The court
ruled that there are "important differences between powers reserved
to revoke a trust or change a beneficiary in life insurances on the
one hand and a mere right of action to avoid a conveyance by a
lunatic on the other." 5 In the former the reserved power is regarded as an integral part of the instrument creating the gift, while
in the latter, a conveyance is at once absolute in form and effect,
subject only to possible defeat by a plenary law suit. The court
in summing up stated, that "a practical mind whether legal or lay,
would not be likely to consider the property in this case as a part
of the estate of Mr. Bowles. The question here is not whether
Congress could have taxed the property but whether it has taxed
it; and if, as must be the scope of that subsection is restricted to
its literal wording, we must conclude that this particular property
is not covered." 6 This view re-echoes the trend of the courts in
construing tax laws. While they are sedulous to prevent tax evasions, they uniformly maintain that such statutes are not to be ex-7
tended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used .
Whenever there is a doubt as to the meaning of the statute it should
be resolved in favor of the tax payer.8
2 Safe

Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Tait, 54 F. (2d) 383, 386.
'Reilly v. Carter, 76 Md. 581, 25 Atl. 667 (1893); Flach v. Gottschalk

Co., 88 Md. 368, 41 Atl. 908 (1898); Valentine v. Lunt, 115 N. Y. 496, 22
N. E. 209 (1889) ; Highes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446 (1889) ; Smith
v. Ryan, 191 N. Y. 452, 84 N. E. 402 (1908) ; Atkinson v. McCulloh, 149 Md.
662, 132 AtI. 148 (1926).
'Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126
(1929) ; Reinecke v. Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929).
'Supra note 2 at 386. The government had cited Crooks v. Harrelson,
supra note 1, which held simply that where the owner of property parts with it
reserving the power of recall, his death is the fact or event which makes the
gift absolute.
'Supra note 2 at 387.
' Crooks v. Harrelson, supra note 1; United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S.
179, 44 Sup. Ct. 64 (1928).
8 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1919); Reinecke v. Trust
Co., supra note 4.
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The judicial mind ought not to be impervious to ideas merely
because they are new, provided they are sound in principle. But
the formidable doctrine of stare decisis here invoked regarding interpretation of tax statutes has been so widely recognized by the
courts that confusion if not contradictions of principles would result if the court determined other than it did.
W. B. S.

